University Officials Go to Great Lengths to Cover Up Thefts

Find out the real story of Glenn Walp's firing at the Los Alamos National Lab, why he's fighting back, and what it means for Clemson.

By: Amanda Carey

Posted: 4/23/09

In May 2007, The Observer reported evidence that linked Clemson University officials to the cover-up of a theft at an off-campus research lab, and that that theft had the potential to harm national security. What was not reported at the time was that theft at research labs has been a widespread problem across the United States. Consider the following.

In 1999, a Chinese-American scientist who worked for the University of California at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Wen Ho Lee, was indicted by a federal grand jury for stealing classified information about U.S. nuclear arsenal for China. Federal prosecutors were ultimately unable to prove all 59 indictment counts, but Lee pleaded guilty to improper handling of restricted data as part of a settlement in a separate government investigation. But while Lee was never found guilty of actually giving classified information to the Chinese government, the suspicions remained.

As a result of the Wen Ho Lee incident and other national security threats that occurred at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in 2000, the Department of Energy (DOE) placed new standards on lab procedures. One of which, was hiring someone to professionally direct the lab's Office of Security Inquires (OSI).

The goal of the DOE in setting these new mandates was the prevention of similar incidents in the future. Furthermore, if the new standards were not met, the University of California had the potential to lose millions of dollars and even their contract with DOE.

During a congressional hearing, Rep. James Greenwood (PA) commented on the situation saying, "Given the length of time UC operated without the threat of competition, it appears that it has been lulled into a state of irresponsible complacency." Rep. Peter Deutsch (Fla) also said, "Laboratory management became arrogant and defiant over the years…When problems were uncovered, they made promises…We have found missing hard drives and other classified electronic media for which there are no acceptable explanations…the entire…system is in shambles."

Now enter Mr. Glenn Walp. Walp was hired in 2002 to investigate the thefts and improve the lab's overall security, but was fired when his investigation led him to an all-too unpleasant truth about the goings-on at LANL. What he found was a "culture of theft" and even more worrisome- officials who wanted it covered up, at all costs. Walp shared his story and thoughts with me about lab thefts and the seriousness of the potential damage.

AC: From what I understand, you were fired from Los Alamos National Lab for investigating corruption and stolen equipment. Can you briefly recount your story and what exactly caused your being fired?

GW: After a nationwide search I was hired in January, 2002 as the Office Leader of the lab's OSI, to, ostensibly, correct the security failings. I was immediately directed to "professionalize all OSI operations" and, at the forceful pleadings to my immediate supervisor by the lab's Director of Intelligence, "create a report outlining the lab's theft problems"; the Director proposing that lab thefts could jeopardize the lab's national secrets. Within a few weeks I was able to uncover that over $3 million in federal property was either lost or stolen within a three year period, with lab officials having no idea where the missing property was.

Most alarming was that most lab officials had no knowledge of the losses or thefts, even though hundreds of lab computers were among the missing. Within a few months other major crimes were uncovered, to include millions of dollars of thefts from the Nonproliferation and International Security Division (a top security area), misuse of federal credit cards, and thefts by use of the lab's purchasing systems and forgery. OSI was assisting the FBI and the DOE Inspector General with their investigations which were now going public.

As a result I met huge resistance from certain lab officials - intent on protecting their multi- billion dollar DOE contract, and conjunctively, their lucrative salaries and benefits - who were threatened by my presence. Because of this, I encountered interference by certain lab leaders, and was subsequently told that unless I complied with the lab's "corporate philosophy" of protecting the lab, I could be fired, or as it was put more emphatically, "leveled with both barrels." And I was.

Federal investigations determined the reason I was fired was that a lab official didn't want me to speak to DOE Inspector General Investigators who were about to investigate the lab. After the UC conducted an internal inquiry I was rehired, UC admitting that LANL officials had wrongfully terminated my employment.

As a result of my efforts and that of two of my colleagues (also former police officers), among other things, 18 LANL employees were either fired or reassigned - to include the Director and Deputy Director - and for the first time since the beginning of the Manhattan Project UC had to bid for the LANL contract.

AC: What items specifically were stolen from the lab?

GW: Items that were stolen included anything imaginable. The thefts occurred through direct theft, or illegally ordering/purchasing items through the labs multiple purchasing systems and then taking the items off of lab property by secreting them upon their person, or by loading up personal vehicles and driving away.

There were hundreds of different items that included computers, telephones, tractors, hunting/camping equipment, GPS systems, electric doors, clothing, rototillers, an industrial water tank, a one-ton magnet lifting unit, computer workstations, cash, air compressors, vacuum systems, tools, shoes, go-carts, knives, model airplanes, and on and on. A federal credit card was used to purchase personal groceries and gas, as well as for gambling at a local casino. One person forged a travel voucher and placed the money into their personal bank account.

AC: Why do you think the American people should be worried about these thefts? Are they harming national security? And if so, how?

GW: I don't believe Americans should be worried about these happenings; they should be petrified with fear and express outraged indignation. In answering why I state this, I defer to the experts. That is: The statement of Michigan Representative Mike Rodgers during one of the three congressional hearings held on LANL/UC operations:"My concern is if you're willing to steal, you're willing to sell information as well." LANL's Director Pete Nanos was asked by the media if espionage could be involved in a 2004 LANL security failure, to which Nanos stated: "Nothing could be excluded."; and the statement of the DOE Inspector General during the first congressional hearing: "I would not…express a great deal of confidence…that there was no sensitive or classified information compromised in the thefts or property loss (at LANL)…with 400 computers in three years…there can be no guarantees that security was not compromised." From 2002 to 2009 there has been a continuous flow of major security failures at LANL. I say, let American citizens decide.

AC: You talked before about a "culture of theft" at the lab in New Mexico. In your opinion, why has theft become such a problem there, and around the country? Furthermore, why are universities so concerned about covering up the thefts?

GW: In my own experience during a lab training program the issue of theft came up. The instructor mentioned the name of a lab employee who each year during elk hunting season stole certain items for his hunting trips - and that everyone knew it. When I questioned the instructor on the issue, and why the lab would let this continue, the response was, "Well that is just Harry." After which most of the other attendees, that included a cross-section of lab employs, burst into boisterous laughter. To me theft was so engrained within the lab culture that for many it became a way of life, thus condoned and overlooked. It appeared to me that no one, or at least not many, really cared. I pondered many times: Why did it take me to come here to uncover this crime and do something about it? It was obvious to me that this wayward philosophy had been imbedded in the lab culture for years, perhaps decades. I told federal investigators, if lab officials are so dysfunctional when it comes to administrative, operational and financial management, can Americans really believe that they will do any better with the protection of our national security? For me, the answer was no and still is no.

I opine the driving force behind the nonchalant attitude concerning theft occurs, whether at LANL, other institutions of corporate America, investment firms, Wall Street, and so forth, because of the time worn, but ever so true view that the love of money - driven by greed - is the root of all evil.

Why any institution under like circumstances such as LANL is so concerned about covering up thefts or similar mishaps, is, in my opinion, because they don't want the bad press that will expose their failings. Bad press has the potential of melting their golden calf - their federal contract. Obviously, if the contract is lost people lose jobs, positions, salaries and benefits; institutions lose peripheral income from these multi-billion dollar contracts; and from a human perspective, they don't want their egos crushed or their power removed. From my view, the irony of LANL was that the very thing LANL officials were attempting to protect was exactly what they lost. That can happen when you let greed and corruption rule your thoughts.

AC: If I understand correctly, you are writing a book about this subject. Can you tell me a little about it?

GW: I have authored a book on my experiences at Los Alamos, entitled, at least at this point: Implosion at Los Alamos: How Corruption and Cover-Ups Jeopardize America's Nuclear Weapons Secrets. The projected release date is sometime this year, with a media kickoff event in Washington, D.C.

AC: Does your book specifically mention the Clemson case? What have you found about the theft here at Clemson and how does it relate to what happened in New Mexico? Did the Clemson theft harm national security?

GW: Yes my book briefly mentions the Clemson theft incident where criminals allegedly stole an All-Sky Imaging Photometer - a device that has military applications. Ergo, if this device gets into the wrong hands it could have national security implications. As far as I know no one has been arrested for the theft nor was the equipment recovered. If this is so, a valid question by Americans is, I suggest, "Into whose hands has it fallen and for what purpose? I have not conducted an in-depth research on the Clemson incident, my knowledge being limited to what I have been able to garner from newspaper accounts and interviews with a Clemson employee in the know. What I perceive as a relationship between the Clemson matter and LANL, is that it appears, allegedly, that a Clemson official may have attempted to cover-up the theft and only came forward when squeezed by federal officials. Further, I understand that a Clemson official's rationale for not reporting the theft was, allegedly, the same rationale used on me by one of my bosses at LANL. That is, once the federal government allocates funding to a university, the money, or the products purchased by the money, no longer belongs to the government (American taxpayer), but rather, the university. Consequently, if an item is stolen it is the universities decision whether to report it or not, since they are the owner/victim, not the federal government. This reasoning, in my opinion, is totally contrary to federal law and rational reasoning, as well as brazen contempt for federal law and the American taxpayer.

AC: How you would respond to accusation that you are merely a disgruntled former employee, looking for revenge against your former employer?

GW: A common tactic used by organization to damage a whistleblower's claims is to disparage them by stating they are disgruntle employees trying to get even, and at times even calling them mentally ill. Within my book one chapter is dedicated to the personal experiences of one of our undercover informants at LANL, and the hell that was poured upon him by certain LANL personnel for helping to expose LANL crimes and corruption. Fortunately for me, congressional investigations, federal investigations, national media investigations and reports and private organization studies initiated by UC officials proved that all that I was saying was the absolute truth. As stated by the DOE Inspector General, based on his investigations, and agreed to by a top UC official, my firing was incomprehensible.